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Product Liability
by Franklin P. Brannen, Jr.*
and Jacob E. Daly**
This Article surveys developments in Georgia product liability law
between June 1, 2010 and May 31, 2011.1 It covers noteworthy cases
decided during this period by the Georgia appellate courts, the United
States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, and the United States district courts located in
Georgia.
I. FAILURE TO WARN
To prevail on a failure to warn claim, a plaintiff must come forward
with evidence that: (1) the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that there is a danger that may arise from the intended use of
the product; (2) a reasonable user of the product would be unaware of
the danger; and (3) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in
informing the user about the danger.2 "Whether a duty to warn exists
... depends upon foreseeability of the use in question, the type of danger
involved, and the foreseeability of the user's knowledge of the danger."'
In Kelley v. Hedwin Corp.,' a hospital clinical engineer sued the

manufacturer of a five-gallon collapsible plastic cube. At this hospital,

* Counsel in the firm of King & Spalding, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University
(B.A., 1992); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1996).
Member, State Bars of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida.
** Of Counsel in the firm of Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Virginia (B.A., 1993); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law
(J.D., cum laude, 2000). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia product liability law during the prior survey period, see
Franklin P. Brannen, Jr. & Jacob E. Daly, Product Liability, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 62 MERCER L. REv. 243 (2010).
2. Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 724, 450 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1994); Carmical v.
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 117 F.3d 490, 495-96 (11th Cir. 1997).
3. Giordano v. Ford Motor Co., 165 Ga. App. 644, 645, 299 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1983).
4. 308 Ga. App. 509, 707 S.E.2d 895 (2011).
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the container was used to store and dispense embalming fluid containing
formaldehyde. One evening, the plaintiff received a call that liquid had
spilled from the container onto the floor. Although the plaintiff was
aware that the spilled liquid contained formaldehyde and the hospital's
environmental services group had refused to clean up the liquid, he
proceeded to clean without a mask or protective gear. Unsurprisingly,
the plaintiff experienced shortness of breath and coughing.'
The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the manufacturer of the container
contending that the manufacturer should have warned that the gravityfed spigot in the container could cause a large spill if the spigot were
The trial court granted the manufacturer's motion for
uncapped.'
summary judgment, and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed,
emphasizing that, under Georgia law, "there is no duty resting upon a
manufacturer or seller to warn of a product-connected danger which is
obvious or generally known."' Here, the court of appeals concluded that
it is common knowledge that opening a container and turning it on its
side will allow the contents to spill.' A manufacturer has no duty to
warn a consumer about information that is known to a reasonable
person.'

R&R Insulation Services, Inc. v. Royal Indemnity Co.1 o arose from a
fire at a chicken processing plant owned by Wayne Farms. Wayne
Farms and its insurance subrogors filed suit against Crane Company,
the manufacturer of fiberglass panels that were used as interior finish
materials at the chicken plant, contending that Crane failed to properly
warn regarding the installation of fiberglass panels using nylon rivets,
instead of metal rivets. At the close of discovery, Crane moved for
summary judgment on the failure to warn claim, but the trial court
denied the motion."
Crane's first argument on appeal was that it did not owe a duty to
warn Wayne Farms because Crane did not have any knowledge of the
alleged defect.12 But the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the
instructions Crane provided to customers recommended using nylon
rivets or non-corroding fasteners to install the fiberglass panels at issue,
and it was a question of fact for the jury to decide whether Crane

5. Id. at 509-10, 707 S.E.2d at 897.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 510, 707 S.E.2d at 897-98.
Id. at 510-11, 707 S.E.2d at 897-98 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 511, 707 S.E.2d at 898.

9.

Id.

10.
11.
12.

307 Ga. App. 419, 705 S.E.2d 223 (2010).
Id. at 419-20, 705 S.E.2d at 228-29.
Id. at 428, 705 S.E.2d at 233.
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breached a duty through its recommendation to end users and whether
any breach was the proximate cause of Wayne Farms' damages.13
Next, Crane argued that Wayne Farms should be considered a
sophisticated user because Wayne Farms had previously used the
fiberglass panels." But the court of appeals emphasized that, because
this issue was being considered at the summary judgment stage,
questions of fact remained regarding the extent of Wayne Farms'
knowledge that would determine whether Wayne Farms was a sophisticated user."
Then Crane argued the open and obvious defense-specifically, that
it is common knowledge that plastic will melt or burn when exposed to
flames." The court of appeals disagreed." Because there was evidence in the record that certain types of fiberglass panels are made with
different levels of fire retardant, it is not obvious from looking at the
panel whether it will burn rapidly and in the manner that Wayne Farms
alleged it burned."
Finally, Crane contended that Wayne Farms failed to come forward
with evidence that any alleged failure to warn by Crane was the
proximate cause of Wayne Farms' damages." In affirming the denial
of summary judgment on this issue, the court of appeals referred to
expert testimony from Wayne Farms' expert witnesses linking the
fiberglass panels to the spread of the fire.20 In addition, to the extent
that Crane claimed that Wayne Farms did not directly rely on any
recommendations from Crane and thus there was no proximate cause to
support the failure to warn claim, the court of appeals cited again the
recommendations that Crane provided to consumers regarding the
installation of the fiberglass panels."
In Rivers v. H.S. Beauty Queen, Inc.,22 the plaintiff sustained burns
to her face and chest while using a scented-oil burner when she
attempted to extinguish the flame in the burner by blowing on the flame.
Instead of putting out the burner, the flame grew larger and exploded
in the plaintiffs face causing second-degree burns. The plaintiff brought
a lawsuit against the seller of the burner claiming, in part, that the

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 428, 705 S.E.2d at 233-34.
Id. at 428, 705 S.E.2d at 234.
Id. at 429, 705 S.E.2d at 234.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 429, 705 S.E.2d at 234-35.
Id. at 429-30, 705 S.E.2d at 235.
306 Ga. App. 866, 703 S.E.2d 416 (2010).
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seller failed to warn her regarding foreseeable dangers associated with
using the burner. After discovery, the trial court granted the manufacturer's motion for summary judgment.23
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of
summary judgment to the seller on the failure to warn claim because the
seller had no independent duty to communicate warnings that the
plaintiff already had received. While the seller had sold the burner
without including any instructions or warnings from the manufacturer,
the oil that was used in the burner was accompanied by written
warnings including a warning not to allow the oil to contact an open
flame.2 5 In her deposition, the plaintiff admitted that she had read this
warning before using the burner.2 6 In addition, the court emphasized
that "the danger of receiving a burn from the open flame of a candle is
an obvious danger for which there is no duty to warn."27
In Kersey u. Dolgencorp LLC,"8 the plaintiff, who had severe diabetic
neuropathy, brought a lawsuit against Dolgencorp LLC, the manufacturer of a rub cream analgesic similar to Ben-Gay@ or Icy Hot@. A few
times in May 2008, the plaintiff applied some of the rub cream to her
feet and then put on her shoes and socks. At the end of the month, the
plaintiff developed ulcers on her feet. 9 The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the rub cream alleging, in part, that the manufacturer "knew or
certainly had reason to know that the subject Muscle Rub was likely to
be dangerous for the intended use of irritating the skin, dilating blood
vessels and increasing local blood flow in high-risk diabetic persons.""
At the close of discovery, the manufacturer moved for summary
judgment."
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
granted the manufacturer's motion on the failure to warn claim because
it had no knowledge that diabetic users of the cream were susceptible to
injury. 2 All of the evidence in the record confirmed that the manufacturer had never received a complaint of any injury related to consumers'
use of the cream after manufacturing more than eight million tubes of
the cream, and there were no reports in the medical or scientific

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 866-67, 703 S.E.2d at 416-17.
Id. at 869-70, 703 S.E.2d at 419.
Id. at 869, 703 S.E.2d at 419.
Id. at 867, 703 S.E.2d at 417.
Id. at 869-70, 703 S.E.2d at 419.
No. 1:09-CV-898-RWS, 2011 WL 1670886 (N.D. Ga. May 3, 2011).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
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literature regarding adverse reaction by diabetics who used this rub
cream.33 In addition, the court noted that the plaintiff also had a
problem establishing proximate cause.34 The plaintiff had ulcer issues
with her feet from her diabetes before and after using the cream." The
court implied that the plaintiff likely misused the product because she
had used the product for about a year and only had an issue after she
applied the cream to her feet and then put on her socks and shoes,
which is contrary to a provided warning not to bandage the applied
area.3 6
In Lockman v. S.R. Smith, LLC,37 the plaintiff sustained a broken
neck after jumping off of a diving board at his parents' home. The
plaintiff claimed that S.R. Smith, the manufacturer of the diving board,
was liable because it failed to provide adequate warning labels on the
diving board. During his deposition, the plaintiff testified that he was
twenty-eight years old when he sustained his injury, and he knew others
who had been injured by striking their heads after diving into a pool
from a diving board. Furthermore, the plaintiff had read warnings on
diving boards that warned swimmers to dive with arms extended, and
he had successfully dived into his parents' pool previously without any
incident. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia granted summary judgment for S.R. Smith because it had not
breached any duty owed to the plaintiff regarding the warnings that
accompanied the diving board.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court because "[u]nder
Georgia law, 'there is no duty on the seller to warn the user or consumer
of a . . . danger that [he] should recognize.""' Here, the appellate court

found that the plaintiff's testimony established that he was familiar with
the pool and the dangers associated with using a diving board.4 0
Accordingly, any failure by S.R. Smith to provide additional warnings
was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.4

33. Id.
34. Id. at *6 n.1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 405 F. App'x 471 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
38. Id. at 472-73.
39. Id. at 473 (second alteration in original) (quoting Boyce v. Gregory Poole Equip. Co.,
269 Ga. App. 891, 895, 605 S.E.2d 384, 388 (2004)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

A.

Expert Testimony
Almost seven years ago, Georgia adopted the standard from Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc." for assessing the admissibility
of testimony from expert witnesses in civil actions." While the Georgia
appellate courts have provided guidance regarding the application of the
Daubert standard in other types of lawsuits, there have been few
Daubert opinions from the Georgia appellate courts in product liability
cases.44 Without state appellate court guidance, practitioners and
judges must rely on decisions from the federal courts as persuasive
authority.45 The following case from a district court in the Eleventh
Circuit offers recent guidance on Daubert issues in product liability
cases.
The limits that Daubert places on novel expert theory were addressed
in Sumner v. Biomet, Inc., " a lawsuit in which the plaintiff underwent
surgery involving the placement of a metal-on-metal hip joint prosthesis
in her right hip. Over the next few months, multiple x-rays of the
plaintiff's surgically repaired hip revealed metal debris floating in the
area of the implant. To remedy this issue, the plaintiff's doctor decided
to replace the original prosthesis with a new one. The plaintiff filed a
lawsuit against the manufacturer of the prosthetic hip joint alleging that
the prosthetic device was defectively manufactured, and that the
manufacturer failed to warn about the defect.
The plaintiffs expert witness, Rex McLellan, who has a doctorate in
metallurgy, served as the primary source of proof for her claim that the
prosthetic was defectively manufactured. In his initial expert report, Dr.

42. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
43. S. 3, § 7, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1, 8 (codified as amended
at O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (2010)).
44. See, e.g., Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Grp., P.C., 285 Ga. 667,670-71,681 S.E.2d
152, 155 (2009) (applying Daubert in medical malpractice action); Mays v. Ellis, 283 Ga.
App. 195, 199 & n.3, 641 S.E.2d 201, 204 & n.3 (2007) (discussing application of Daubert
in medical malpractice claim); Cotten v. Phillips, 280 Ga. App. 280, 286-87, 633 S.E.2d 655,
659-60 (2006) (applying Daubert in malpractice case).
45. To interpret the application of Georgia's Daubert statute, courts may seek guidance
from the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136

(1997), Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and other federal court
interpretations of these decisions. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(f).
46. No. 7:08-CV-98(HL), 2010 WL 4736320 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 16, 2010).
47. Id. at *1.
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McLellan indicated that there were areas of chemical inhomogeneity on
the surface of the ball of the prosthesis that caused particles to shed off
of the prosthesis and that this chemical inhomogeneity resulted from
improper manufacturing. Through a supplemental expert report and
two depositions, Dr. McLellan's opinion wavered regarding which metals
caused the inhomogenous surface, but he essentially maintained his
theory that the loose particles were ejected from the prosthesis because
of inhomogeneities in the metal used to make the ball of the prosthe-

sis.48
After discovery, the manufacturer moved to exclude the testimony of
Dr. McClellan, and the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia considered whether Dr. McLellan's particle-ejection
theory satisfied the mandates of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 4 and
Daubert.so First, the court found that Dr. McLellan had not tested his
theory or shown that his theory was capable of being tested." Next,
the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show that Dr. McLellan's
theory had been the subject of publication and peer review." Then, the
court highlighted that the plaintiff was unable to show a rate of error for
Dr. McLellan's theory." Finally, the court concluded that Dr. McLellan's particle-ejection theory had not been accepted in the proper
scientific community." The court based this conclusion on the fact that
no one in the world, other than Dr. McLellan, had ever expressed the
opinion that inhomogeneity in the surface metals could result in the
ejection of metal fragments."s In addition, Dr. McLellan had developed
this theory solely as part of his work in this case." While the development of an opinion solely for purposes of litigation is not sufficient to
make the opinion unreliable, the failure to show the use of the theory by
anyone else outside the current litigation weighs heavily toward a
conclusion that the theory is unreliable." Accordingly, the district
court excluded Dr. McLellan's testimony because his particle-ejection

48.
49.
50.

Id. at *1-2.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
Sumner, 2010 WL 4736320, at *2.

51.

Id. at *4.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
1995)).

Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir.
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theory was the product of unreliable methodology that did not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 702.

B.

Spoliation

Spoliation is "the destruction or failure to preserve evidence that is
necessary to contemplated or pending litigation."" Georgia courts
consider the following factors when determining whether spoliation of
evidence requires dismissal of the plaintiff's claims:
(1) whether the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the destruction
of the evidence; (2) whether the prejudice could be cured; (3) the
practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether the plaintiff acted in
good or bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse if expert testimony
about the evidence was not excluded.'
Sanctions for the spoliation of evidence can range from an adverse jury
instruction,6 1 to exclusion of expert witnesses, and ultimately, dismissal
of the plaintiff's claims.62

In R&R Insulation Services, Inc. v. Royal Indemnity Co.,63 Crane
Industries, the manufacturer of fiberglass panels, sought the ultimate
penalty of dismissal for the plaintiff Wayne Farms' spoliation of parts of
a chicken processing plant that were affected by a fire for which Wayne
Farms sought to recover damages from Crane. Wayne Farms investigated the fire and provided notice to eight parties of their opportunity to
inspect the damaged parts of the processing plant. But Crane was not
provided notice until after Wayne Farms had repaired the part of the
plant where the fire originated.
Because the trial court did not specify the basis for why it had denied
Crane's motion for sanctions-whether Wayne Farms had not spoliated
evidence or whether the conduct of Wayne Farms did not warrant the
sanction of dismissal-the Georgia Court of Appeals had to review the
voluminous record and reassess each issue." Wayne Farms argued
that there was no spoliation of evidence because there was no dispute
regarding the location of the origin of the fire, and the items that Wayne

58. Id. at *6.
59. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC v. Campbell, 258 Ga. App. 767, 768, 574
S.E.2d 923, 926 (2002).
60. Id. at 768-69, 574 S.E.2d at 926.
61. Id. at 771, 574 S.E.2d at 927-28.
62. Id. at 768, 574 S.E.2d at 926.
63. 307 Ga. App. 419, 705 S.E.2d 223 (2010). For an additional discussion of this case,
see supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text.
64. R&R Insulation, 307 Ga. App. at 435, 705 S.E.2d at 238.
65. Id. at 436, 705 S.E.2d at 239.
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Farms had replaced were only relevant to that issue. 6
But the
appellate court disagreed and concluded that Wayne Farms had
destroyed critical evidence because Crane actually disputed where and
how the fire started.
While there was photographic and video
evidence of the fire scene before repair, the court of appeals emphasized
that "[alithough the existence of photographs may mitigate the loss [of
Because
evidence], they are no substitute for the actual evidence."
allowing
Wayne Farms had disposed of the burned components without
Crane an opportunity to inspect the evidence, the court of appeals
concluded that Wayne Farms had spoliated evidence."
Next, the court of appeals considered whether the trial court had
appropriately refused to grant the requested sanction of dismissal of the
claims against Crane.o
When assessing whether sanctions are
appropriate for spoliation of evidence, a trial court has a wide range of
options to remedy the spoliation: from evidentiary presumptions to the
ultimate sanction of dismissal." Here, Crane had only sought dismissal of the action and no lesser sanction." The court of appeals held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the
action against Crane because "ldjismissal is usually reserved for cases
involving malicious destruction of evidence, which does not appear to be
the case here."" In addition, the ability of Crane to present a defense
had not been so diminished as to be impossible or improbable.7 4
This decision shows practitioners that in cases in which there is not
strong evidence of malice regarding the destruction of the evidence, the
aggrieved party should seek both dismissal and a lesser sanction so that
the choice for the trial court does not become an all-or-nothing proposition in which the aggrieved party receives no relief.

III.

DEFENSES

A. Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that
federal law is "the supreme Law of the Land .

66.
67.
68.

. any Thing in the

Id. at 437, 705 S.E.2d at 240.
Id. at 437-38, 705 S.E.2d at 240.
Id. at 438, 705 S.E.2d at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted).

69. Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 438-39, 705 S.E.2d at 241.
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Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.""
Thus, state laws that conflict with federal law are "without effect."06
A state law conflicts with a federal law "if it interferes with the methods
by which the federal statute was designed to reach [its] goal," even if
both the federal law and the state law have the same goal.7 ' Although
preemption issues are typically analyzed in connection with a federal
statute, a federal regulation may have the same preemptive effect as a
federal statute." State laws subject to preemption include not only
state statutes and regulations, but also tort duties imposed by state
common law and enforced by lawsuits."
"The critical question in any pre-emption analysis is always whether
Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law.""o In
fact, Congress's purpose in enacting the federal law is the "ultimate
touchstone" of the preemption analysis."' Congress may manifest its
intent to preempt state law in three ways:
First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law. Pre-emption fundamentally is a question of
congressional intent, and when Congress has made its intent known
through explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an easy one.
Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is
pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress
intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively. Such an
intent may be inferred from a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it, or where an Act of Congress touches a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject....

75. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
76. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
77. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987).
78. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (holding that "a
federal agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may [also]
pre-empt state regulation"); see also Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 154 (1982) (noting that a "narrow focus on Congress' intent to supersede state
law [is] misdirected" when a state law is claimed to be preempted by a federal agency's
regulation).
79. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993); Cipollone v. Liggett
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1992); see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen's
Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) ("The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling
policy.").
80.

Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 369.

81. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
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Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law. Thus, the Court has found pre-emption
where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and
federal requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."
Although Congress's purpose is important, there is a presumption that
Congress did not intend to preempt state law, especially when it "has
legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied."'
Because "the regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and
historically, a matter of local concern,"' state law regulating these
matters is preempted only if Congress's intent to do so is "clear and
manifest."" Thus, when faced with two or more plausible interpretations of a federal law, this presumption imposes on courts "a duty to
accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption."'
During the survey period, the United States Supreme Court decided
one case involving express preemption and one case involving implied
preemption, and it came to opposite conclusions in each case. The
express preemption case involved the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986, and the implied preemption case involved Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard 208.

1. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.

Previous

articles have discussed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986 (Vaccine Act)," the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program that it created, its preemption clause, and how various federal
and state courts have interpreted the scope of its preemption clause."
Before the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court held in American

82. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990) (citations, punctuation, and
internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
84. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985).
85. Id. at 715 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("So we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").
86. Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).

87.

42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2006).

88. Franklin P. Brannen, Jr. & Jacob E. Daly, Product Liability, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 61 MERCER L. REV. 267, 278-81 (2009) [hereinafter Brannen & Daly, 2009
Annual Survey]; Franklin P. Brannen, Jr. & Jacob E. Daly, Product Liability, Annual
Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 303, 328-32 (2008).
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Home ProductsCorp. v. Ferrari"that the Vaccine Act does not preempt
all state-law claims for design defect.o All other courts that considered
91 held
the issue, except for the Georgia Court of Appeals in Ferrari,
92
that the Vaccine Act preempts at least some of these claims.
This
split in authority came to a head in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc.," when
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the
Georgia Supreme Court's analysis in Ferrariand held that the Vaccine
Act preempts at least some, if not all, design defect claims.94 Both the
vaccine manufacturers in Bruesewitz and the plaintiffs in Ferrarifiled
a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court,"
and the Court granted the petition in Bruesewitz."
The Supreme Court resolved the issue in favor of the vaccine
manufacturers in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC.9" The case involved a child
whose pediatrician administered doses of a vaccine for diphtheria,
tetanus, and pertussis according to the childhood immunization schedule
recommended by the Centers for Disease Control. Within twenty-four
hours of the child's six-month vaccination, she began experiencing
seizures. She experienced more than a hundred seizures during the
following month, and she was eventually diagnosed with residual seizure
disorder and developmental delay. The child's parents filed a claim in
the United States Court of Federal Claims, as required by the Vaccine
Act, and a special master ruled against them. They then filed a lawsuit
against the manufacturer of the vaccine in a Pennsylvania state court,

89. 284 Ga. 384, 668 S.E.2d 236 (2008).
90. Id. at 393, 668 S.E.2d at 242.
91. Ferrari v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 286 Ga. App. 305, 312, 650 S.E.2d 585, 590
(2007).
92. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 430, 445-46 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Sykes v.
Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289,303 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods.
Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664-66 (S.D. Tex. 2004); Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 810
N.Y.S.2d 506, 509 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). One other state court sided with the Georgia
Supreme Court's opinion in Ferrari,but that court issued its opinion only a month and a
half before the United States Supreme Court decided Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct.
1068 (2011). Wright v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 14 A.3d 850, 880 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011)
(holding that Congress's intent regarding the preemptive scope of the Vaccine Act is not
clear from the text, structure, purpose, or legislative history and that, consequently,
preemption decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis).
93. 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009).
94. Id. at 245-46, 251-52.
95. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78
U.S.L.W. 3082 (U.S. Aug. 4, 2009) (No. 09-152); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 284 Ga.
384, 668 S.E.2d 236 (2008), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2009)
(No. 08-1120).
96. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010).
97. 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011). Justice Kagan recused herself from the case.
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alleging that the vaccine caused their daughter's disabilities because it
was defectively designed. Following removal, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the plaintiffs'
claims were preempted by the Vaccine Act. As noted above, the Third
Circuit affirmed."
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's judgment and held
that the Vaccine Act "preempts all design-defect claims against vaccine
manufacturers brought by plaintiffs who seek compensation for injury
Because the question of
or death caused by vaccine side effects."
preemption was a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court began its
analysis with the text of the preemption clause,100 which provides as
follows:
No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for damages
arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the
administration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988, if the injury or death
resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even though the
vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper
directions and warnings.10
The key issue was how to define the word "unavoidable" and the "even
though" clause that follows it.1 02 The word and the following clause do
not have independent meanings; rather, "[t]he 'even though' clause
clarifies the word that precedes it. It delineates the preventative
measures that a vaccine manufacturer must have taken for a side-effect
Thus, if a vaccine
to be considered 'unavoidable' under the statute."'
is properly manufactured and labeled, any remaining side effects are
This "suggests that the design of the
considered unavoidable.1 04
vaccine is a given, not subject to question in the tort action."'os A
vaccine could always be designed to remove or neutralize its harmful
ingredient, and so harmful side effects are always avoidable in that
sense, but the Court rejected this interpretation because it would render
the word "unavoidable" meaningless.' 06 The unavoidability of the side
effects must be evaluated "with respect to the particulardesign," not with

98.
99.

100.

Id. at 1074-75.
Id. at 1082.

Id. at 1075.

101. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(bXl).
102. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1075.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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respect to alternative designs that might have been feasible.o' The
Court also found textual support for its holding in the preemption
clause's explicit reference to two of the three iraditional theories of
product liability-defective manufacture and inadequate labeling-but
complete silence about defective design."o' "It seems that the statute
fails to mention design-defect liability 'by deliberate choice, not
inadvertence."'"09
The Court next considered the structure of the Vaccine Act in
particular and of vaccine regulation in general and concluded that this
reinforces what the text of the preemption clause already suggests.110
The license that a manufacturer receives when its vaccine is approved
outlines how the vaccine must be manufactured and specifies the
instructions and warnings that must accompany the vaccine when it is
distributed."' In addition, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
"pervasively regulate[s] the manufacturing process, down to the
requirements for plumbing and ventilation systems at each manufacturing facility."11 2 In contrast, the Vaccine Act and the FDA's regulations
provide no guidance about how vaccines should be designed and what
criteria are to be used in determining whether a vaccine is safe and
effective.i' Although the Court was quick to say that the absence of
guidance on these issues alone does not suggest preemption, it found in
this instance that "the lack of guidance for design defects combined with
the extensive guidance for the two grounds of liability specifically
mentioned in the [Vaccine] Act strongly suggests that design defects
were not mentioned because they are not a basis for liability."" 4
Moreover, tort liability for a design defect is not necessary because the
Vaccine Act provides other mechanisms for achieving the goals of
imposing such liability.1"' One goal is to compensate people who are
injured because of a defect in the design of a product, and the Vaccine
Act creates a "generous compensation scheme" to fulfill this goal.i'
The other goal is to promote improvements in the design of a product,
and the Vaccine Act contains numerous means of improving the design

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1075-76.
at 1076.
(quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003)).
at 1078-79.
at 1079.
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This structure "reflects a sensible choice to leave
of vaccines.1'
complex epidemiological judgments about vaccine design to the FDA and
the National Vaccine Program rather than juries.""' Finally, the
Vaccine Act contains a structural quid pro quo that is indicative of
preemption for design-defect claims: the vaccine manufacturers fund the
compensation program from their sales, and in exchange they avoid
costly litigation and the uncertainty of jury verdicts." 9 Because
"design-defect allegations are the most speculative and difficult type of
products liability claim to litigate," the Court doubted that Congress
intended to tax the vaccine manufacturers while at the same time
leaving them exposed to such uncertain potential liability for design
defects. 120
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority's textual argument, but
because he considered the textual question to be close, he wrote
separately to express his view of the legislative history, the purpose of
the Vaccine Act, and the position of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS). 1 21 According to Justice Breyer's reading of the
legislative history, Congress intended to allow state-law tort claims
based on improper manufacturing and labeling and to funnel other
claims, including design-defect claims, to the no-fault compensation
system created by the Vaccine Act. 122 This conclusion is reinforced by
the overall purpose of the Vaccine Act, which is to protect the lives of
children "in part by ending 'the instability and unpredictability of the
childhood vaccine market."' 123 Because of state-law tort lawsuits,
many vaccine manufacturers in the early 1980s had withdrawn from the
market or were "question[ing] their continued participation in the
vaccine market," and Congress determined that the loss of vaccine
manufacturers could create a public health hazard by increasing the

117. Id. at 1079-80. These means include (1) the Vaccine Act's directive to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to promote the development of childhood vaccines
that have few and less serious side effects; (2) the creation of a program charged with
preventing infectious diseases and side effects, establishing priorities for federal vaccine
research, and coordinating federal vaccine safety and efficacy testing; (3) requiring vaccine
manufacturers and healthcare providers to report adverse side effects; (4) monitoring
vaccine safety through a collaboration with managed-care organizations; and (5) the
possibility that the FDA may revoke the license for a vaccine if it determines that the
vaccine is not safe. Id.
118. Id. at 1080.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1082-83 (Breyer, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 1083.
123. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6344, 6348).
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amount of unimmunized children and thereby increasing the frequency
of preventable diseases. 12 4 In light of the overall purpose of the
Vaccine Act, Justice Breyer found that "read[ing] the pre-emption clause
as preserving design-defect suits seems anomalous." 25
Under the Vaccine Act, HHS determines whether "a vaccine is safe
enough to be licensed and which licensed vaccines" (and associated
injuries) should be included in the no-fault compensation program, and
a special master in the program determines whether a person has
sustained a compensable injury and, if not, whether the vaccine
nevertheless caused the person's injury.'26 "To allow a jury in effect
to second-guess those determinations is to substitute less expert for more
expert judgment, thereby threatening manufacturers with liability
(indeed, strict liability) in instances where any conflict between experts
and nonexperts is likely to be particularly severe-instances where
Congress intended the contrary."' 27 Justice Breyer was unable to
reconcile these potential conflicts and tort liability for design defect with
Congress's intent of protecting vaccine manufacturers from liability and
involving experts in making compensation decisions. 28
Finally,
Justice Breyer gave significant weight to the view of HHS, which was
that allowing design-defect claims could precipitate the same crisis that
caused Congress to enact the Vaccine Act in the first place because (1)
HHS better understands immunization policy and the potential impact
of state-law tort claims, and (2) numerous public health organizations
supported HHS's view.'29
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented because she
believed the majority ignored important language in the preemption
clause, misconstrued the legislative history, and disturbed the careful
balance reflected in the Vaccine Act between compensating children
injured by vaccines and stabilizing the childhood vaccine market.3 o
According to her view of the text, structure, and legislative history of the
Vaccine Act, state-law tort claims against vaccine manufacturers are
preempted only if "the vaccine was properly manufactured and labeled,
and . . . the side effects stemming from the vaccine's design could not

have been prevented by a feasible alternative design that would have
eliminated the adverse side effects without compromising the vaccine's

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1084.
at 1085.

at 1085-86.
at 1086 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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This obviously would require a case-by-case
cost and utility.""'
assessment of whether design-defect claims are preempted, and Justice
Sotomayor argued that this approach strikes a more appropriate balance
between compensating children who are injured by a vaccine and
3 2
protecting manufacturers to ensure a stable and predictable market.1
The majority's view, on the other hand, "leaves a regulatory vacuum in
which no one ensures that vaccine manufacturers adequately take
account of scientific and technological advancements when designing or
Because "[tihe normal competitive
distributing their products.""'
to existing product lines
improvements
and
innovation
spur
forces that
in other markets .

.

. operate with less force in the vaccine market,"

Justice Sotomayor apparently believes that vaccine manufacturers will
not improve their vaccines without "the traditional incentive and
deterrence functions served by state tort liability."13 4
Six days after issuing its decision in Bruesewitz, the Supreme Court
granted the vaccine manufacturers' petition for writ of certiorari in
Ferrari, vacated the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court, and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of Bruesewitz.M5
On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Georgia Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with Bruesewitz.136 Justice Nahmias concurred specially to
emphasize that Bruesewitz conclusively determined the preemptive scope
of the Vaccine Act and leaves no room for an argument that certain
37
design-defect claims may not be preempted.1

2. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. Pursuant to the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (NTMVSA),1 3 1
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has promulgated
the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS)'a' to further the
NTMVSA's purpose of "reduc[ing] traffic accidents and deaths and
FMVSS 208 governs
injuries resulting from traffic accidents."o4 0
"performance requirements for the protection of vehicle occupants in

131. Id. at 1093.
132. Id. at 1099.
133. Id. at 1086.
134. Id. at 1098.
135. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 131 S. Ct. 1567, 1567 (2011).
136. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 289 Ga. 184, 184, 710 S.E.2d 771, 772 (2011).
137. Id. at 185, 710 S.E.2d at 772 (Nahmias, J., concurring specially).
138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (repealed 1994). Congress repealed the Act in 1994 and
recodified it at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30170 (2006).
139. 49 C.F.R. pt. 571 (2010).
140. 49 U.S.C. § 30101.
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crashes"l4 ' and its purpose is "to reduce the number of deaths of
vehicle occupants, and the severity of injuries, by specifying ...
equipment requirements for active and passive restraint systems." 4 2
The type of restraint system required depends on the type of vehicle and
date of manufacture.'4 3 In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,144
the United States Supreme Court held that when FMVSS 208 allows the
manufacturer to choose a restraint system from among several options,
and the manufacturer selects one of those options for a vehicle, a statelaw tort claim premised on a duty to implement a different restraint
system conflicts with and is preempted by FMVSS 208. 1' However,
as the Georgia Court of Appeals has held, FMVSS 208 does not preempt
a state-law tort claim based on an allegation that the design utilized by
the manufacturer was defective.'46
FMVSS 208 once again came before the Supreme Court during the
survey period in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.,147 which
the Court decided the day after it decided Bruesewitz. In Williamson,
the Williamson family was traveling in a 1993 Mazda minivan when
they were involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. Thanh
Williamson, who was sitting in a rear aisle seat, was wearing a lap-only
belt, while Delbert and Alexa Williamson were wearing lap-and-shoulder
belts. Thanh died as a result of the collision, but Delbert and Alexa
survived. Delbert, Alexa, and Thanh's estate sued Mazda in a California
state court, alleging that Mazda should have installed lap-and-shoulder
belts on the rear aisle seat where Thanh was sitting and that Thanh
died because of the absence of such a belt. The version of FMVSS 208
at issue required automobile manufacturers to install lap-and-shoulder
belts on seats next to a vehicle's doors or frames but permitted them to
choose between lap-and-shoulder belts or lap-only belts for rear inner
seats-that is, middle seats or aisle seats in minivans. Based on this
choice allowed by FMVSS 208 and the rule from Geier, the trial court
and the California Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs' claims were
preempted. Noting that other federal and state appellate courts had
decided this issue the same as the California courts in this case, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether FMVSS 208

141.
142.

49 C.F.R. § 571.208.S1.
Id. § 571.208.S2.

143. Id. § 571.208.S4.
144.

529 U.S. 861 (2000).

145. Id. at 878, 881.
146. Parks v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 294 Ga. App. 112, 114, 668 S.E.2d 554, 556-57
(2008).
147.
case.

131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011). As in Bruesewitz, Justice Kagan recused herself from the

PRODUCTLIABILITY

2011]

297

preempts a state-law tort claim that, if successful, would deprive
automobile manufacturers of the choice between lap-and-shoulder belts
or lap-only belts for rear inner seats by imposing liability on those who
chose the lap-only belt option.14 8
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing its decision in
4
9 The Court noted that the choice under FMVSS 208 at issue
Geier.1
in Geier was among passive restraint systems; the options available to
manufacturers included airbags and automatic belts."'o The plaintiffs
in Geier alleged that the manufacturer was liable for not installing
airbags, but the Court held that this claim was impliedly preempted
because it conflicted with "a significant federal regulatory objective,
namely, the maintenance of manufacturer choice." 5 1 After considering
the history of the regulation of passive restraint systems by the
Department of Transportation (DOT) and its contemporaneous explanation of the regulation when it was promulgated, as well as the Solicitor
General's current (at the time Geier was being litigated) understanding
of the regulation, the Court determined that "manufacturer choice was
an important regulatory objective."152
The Court acknowledged that this case was similar to Geier in that the
manufacturer was given a choice of belt systems and that a state-law
The difference was that the
tort claim would restrict that choice."
choice of belt systems in this case was not a significant regulatory
objective like the choice of passive restraint systems in Geier." To
assess DOT's objective in giving manufacturers a choice of belt systems,
55
the Court examined the same factors that it considered in Geier.1
The history of the regulation of belt systems showed that, in 1984, DOT
rejected a regulation that would have required lap-and-shoulder belts to
be installed in all rear seats."' By 1989, which was when the version
of FMVSS 208 at issue in this case was promulgated, DOT was
convinced that lap-and-shoulder belts would increase safety and that
passengers would use them; the most important reason why it did not
require them was because it thought such a requirement would not be
cost-effective. 5 5 By contrast, DOT had safety concerns about requiring

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at
at
at
at
at

1134-35.
1135-37.
1135.
1135-36.
1136-37.
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at 1136-40.
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airbags and worried that consumers would not accept them and would
not replace them when necessary.'
Further, unlike Geier, the
Solicitor General's view was that F1VSS 208 did not preempt a statelaw tort claim based on an automobile manufacturer's decision not to
install lap-and-shoulder belts for rear inner seats." Thus, the same
considerations that lead the Court to find preemption in Geier indicated
the contrary in this case."'o Allowing automobile manufacturers to
choose whether to install lap-and-shoulder belts for rear inner seats was
not a significant objective of FMVSS 208, and so the Court held that the
plaintiffs' claim was not preempted.161
Although the judgment in Williamson was unanimous, two Justices
penned concurring opinions. Justice Sotomayor concurred with the
judgment and the Court's reasoning, but she wrote separately "to
emphasize the Court's rejection of an overreading of Geier."'6 2 In her
view, too many courts had interpreted Geier to mean that a state-law
tort claim is preempted whenever a manufacturer is permitted to choose
among options and the claim is based on the manufacturer's choice of
To the contrary, a regulation that gives
one of those options."
manufacturers a choice among options is not sufficient, standing alone,
to preempt a state-law tort claim: "courts should only find pre-emption
where evidence exists that an agency has a regulatory objective-e.g.,
obtaining a mix of passive restraint mechanisms, as in Geier-whose
achievement depends on manufacturers having a choice between
options.""' Justice Thomas concurred with the judgment, but not the
Instead, he would have decided the case solely
Court's reasoning."
on the basis of the savings clause in the NTMVSA,' 66 which provides
that "[clompliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under
this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.""
He criticized the Court's "purposes-and-objectives" preemption analysis
as "wholly illegitimate" because "[i]t instructs courts to pre-empt state
laws based on judges' 'conceptions of a policy which Congress has not

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1139.
Id.
Id. at 1139-40.
Id. at 1140 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1141 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1141-42.
49 U.S.C. § 30103(e).
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not plainly to be inferred from the legislation
expressed and which is
16 8
enacted."'
has
it
which

B.

Statute of Repose

Because many product liability claims do not accrue until years after
exposure to or use of the allegedly defective product, the statute of
repose is an important defense for manufacturers. Unlike a statute of
limitations, which does not begin to run until the cause of action
accrues,"6 ' "[a] statute of ultimate repose delineates a time period in
which a right may accrue. If the injury occurs outside that period, it is
not actionable."o In other words, "a statute of limitations operates
only on an existing cause of action, while a statute of repose may operate
to extinguish or abolish a potential cause of action prior to its existence."' Thus, a statute of repose stands as a substantial obstacle for
plaintiffs because it can bar an action even before an injury occurs and
before the statute of limitations begins to run."' Similarly, a statute
of repose can effectively shorten the period of limitations if the cause of
action accrues with less time remaining in the period of repose than in
For example, a cause of action that
the period of limitations."'
accrues one month before the period of repose expires will be barred if
a lawsuit is not filed within that month, even if there is a two-year
limitations period applicable to the cause of action."'

168. 131 S. Ct. at 1142 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 75 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting)).
169. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (2007) (providing that claims for personal injuries must
be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues).
170. Hill v. Fordham, 186 Ga. App. 354, 357, 367 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1988); see also
Gwinnett Place Assocs., L.P. v. Pharr Eng'g, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 53, 54 n.2, 449 S.E.2d 889,
890 n.2 (1994) ("A statute of ultimate repose limits absolutely the time during which a
party may bring an action, regardless of when the cause of action accrues. It is
distinguished from a statute of limitation, which is a procedural rule delineating a time
period measured from the accrual of the right of action during which a party must bring
an action.").
171. CHARLEs R. ADAMS III, GEORGIA LAw OF TORTS § 25-9, at 534 (2010-2011 ed.).
172. Hatcher v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 Ga. 100, 101, 344 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1986) (per
curiam) (holding that the statute of repose bars a claim filed outside the repose period
regardless of when the injury occurred), superseded by statute on other grounds, O.C.G.A.
§ 51-1-11(c) (Supp. 2011); Hanna v. McWilliams, 213 Ga. App. 648, 651, 446 S.E.2d 741,
744 (1994) (en banc) ("Moreover, the eight-year repose limit applies regardless of when the
injury occurs or, indeed, whether a cause of action has accrued at all prior to the expiration
of the period.").
173. Hatcher, 256 Ga. at 101, 344 S.E.2d at 420.
174. Id. (Gregory, J., dissenting) ("If someone is injured by the use of personal property
on the last day, or very near the end, of the ten year period commencing with the date of
first sale, there is a great likelihood the injured person would have no opportunity to file
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Georgia's statute of repose for product liability claims is no different;
it "stands as an unyielding barrier to a plaintiff's right of action."1 7 5
As the Georgia Supreme Court has noted:
This amounts to a recognition that the legislature may conclude that
the time may arrive when past transgressions are no longer actionable.
The long history of such conclusions emphasizes their rationality.
From the biblical time of the Year of Jubilee to the present day,
policymakers have exercised the right to "wipe the slate clean" after a
fixed period of time. In doing this, there is the clear distinction
between a statute of limitation "barring" an action, and a statute of
repose providing for the abolition of a cause of action after the passage
of the time provided.'
The statute bars strict liability claims brought more than ten years after
"the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property
causing or otherwise bringing about the injury."' 7
The statute
similarly bars negligence claims, except those based on injuries or
damages arising out of (1) negligence in manufacturing a product that
causes disease or birth defects; (2) conduct that "manifests a willful,
reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property"; and (3) a negligent
failure to warn.1 7 '
The Georgia General Assembly's purpose in
enacting the statute was to eliminate stale claims and remedy problems
in the insurance industry generated by open-ended liability of manufacturers.1 7 9
Although the effects and consequences of the statute are clear,
determining when the repose period begins to run has bedeviled the
courts and has generated much litigation. This would be an easy
question if the repose period began to run upon the first sale of the
product, but the first sale is not always the triggering event. Instead,
the repose period begins to run upon the "first sale for use or consumption" of the product.'s This could be the first sale, but it might also
be several sales into the life of the product, depending on the nature of

suit within the ten year period.").
175. Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga. 844, 845, 426 S.E.2d 870, 871 (1993).
176. Craven v. Lowndes Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 263 Ga. 657, 660, 437 S.E.2d 308, 310
(1993).
177. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(bX2) (Supp. 2011).
178. Id. § 51-1-11(c).
179. Love v. Whirlpool Corp., 264 Ga. 701, 703, 449 S.E.2d 602, 605 (1994); Chrysler
Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 725, 450 S.E.2d 208, 212 (1994); see also Hill, 186 Ga. App.
at 357, 367 S.E.2d at 131 ("These limitations on liability for injuries occurring after a
certain period are based upon reasonable expectations about the useful life of a building
or a manufactured product.").
180. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(b)(2) (emphasis added).

2011]

301

PRODUCT LIABILITY

the product and how it is brought to market. Unfortunately, the statute
does not define this key phrase, and the Georgia Supreme Court and the
Georgia Court of Appeals have struggled to provide a clear definition.
In Pafford v. Biomet,'8 ' the plaintiff sued the alleged manufacturers
of a metal plate that broke several months after it had been installed in
his back and allegedly caused him to become disabled.1 82 The evidence
showed that the plate was sold to the hospital where the plaintiff's
surgery was performed between 1972 and some unknown time in
1980.183 The plaintiff underwent surgery to have the plate installed
in 1988, and he filed his lawsuit in

19 90

.18

Thus, there was no

conclusive evidence that the plaintiff filed his lawsuit within the tenyear repose period. The defendants argued that the repose period began
to run when the hospital bought the plate, which was almost certainly
more than ten years before the plaintiff filed his lawsuit. The plaintiff
argued that the repose period began to run when the hospital sold the
plate to him so that it could be installed in his back, which was only
about two years before he filed his lawsuit.'8 s The Georgia Supreme
Court held that, "by purchasing the plate for mere static retention in its
inventory, the Hospital was not functioning as an active 'user or
consumer' thereof, but only as 'a dealer or any other person' through
whom the plate would ultimately be sold for its intended purpose of
placement in the back of a patient."' 6 This meant that "[tihe 'first
sale for use or consumption' did not occur until [the plate] was removed
from the Hospital's inventory and sold to [the plaintiffl for its actual
intended purpose of placement in his back." 8 7
Twelve years later, the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed this same
issue in Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.'.. In December 1998, the plaintiff's house and vehicles were damaged by a fire that started in her
neighbors' vehicle while it was parked in a carport and spread to her
house. The plaintiff contended that the fire was caused by a faulty
speed-control deactivation switch that was manufactured by Texas
Instruments and installed by Ford when the vehicle was assembled on
August 5, 1992. In June or July 1992, Texas Instruments sold the
switch to Ford but shipped it to another company so that it could be

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

264 Ga. 540, 448 S.E.2d 347 (1994).
Id. at 540-41, 448 S.E.2d at 348.
Pafford v. Biomet, 210 Ga. App. 486, 487, 436 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1993).
Pafford, 264 Ga. at 540-41, 448 S.E.2d at 348.
Id. at 541-42, 448 S.E.2d at 348.
Id. at 542, 448 S.E.2d at 349.

187.

Id. at 543, 448 S.E.2d at 349.

188. 281 Ga. App. 166, 637 S.E.2d 202 (2006).
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installed into a proportional valve. That company shipped the proportional valve to Ford for installation in the vehicle that the plaintiff's
neighbors eventually purchased on July 23, 1993. Texas Instruments
and Ford argued that the "first sale for use or consumption" of the
switch occurred when the vehicle was assembled on August 5, 1992,
which meant that the ten-year repose period would have expired on
August 5, 2002. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that the first
sale for use or consumption did not occur until her neighbors purchased
the vehicle on July 23, 1993, which meant that the ten-year repose
period would have expired on July 23, 2003. Because the plaintiff filed
her complaint after August 5, 2002 and before July 23, 2003,189
determining which event triggered the repose period was critical. 9 0
As the court of appeals read Pafford, the pertinent question was
"whether .. . the 'actual intended purpose' of the switch was not realized
until the car was sold to the consumer."91 Unlike the plate in Pafford,
which the hospital bought from the manufacturer only for static
retention in its inventory until it was sold to a patient, "the switch in
question was not retained as part of Ford's inventory but was placed
immediately into another component and then incorporated into the
[vehicle] on the assembly line.",9 2 Thus, "when the car was driven off
the assembly line, the [switch] had been actively placed in use, was in
fact being used, and did not require purchase from the end user or
consumer to be used for its 'intended purpose."' 9 " This meant that
Ford was a user or consumer of the switch because the switch was
capable of being used for its intended purpose as soon as Ford installed
it in the vehicle and the vehicle became operable, whereas the hospital
in Pafford was not a user or consumer of the plate because the plate
could not be used for its intended purpose until it was inserted into a
Under this rationale, the event triggering the tenpatient's body.'
Ford's assembly of the vehicle on August 5, 1992,
period
was
year repose
period
expired on August 5, 2002-before the plaintiff
and so the repose
filed her complaint."'

189. The opinion does not disclose the date when the plaintiff filed the complaint.
Based on the parties' arguments and the likelihood that the plaintiffs claims were subject
to a four-year limitations period, one can deduce that the plaintiff must have filed the
complaint between August 5, 2002 and the four-year anniversary of the incident in
December 2002.
190. Id. at 166-67, 637 S.E.2d at 203.
191. Id. at 170, 637 S.E.2d at 205.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 171, 637 S.E.2d at 205-06.
195. Id. at 171, 637 S.E.2d at 206.
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Although in Johnson the court of appeals purported to distinguish
Pafford, Johnson actually is inconsistent with Pafford insofar as it
requires the repose period to begin running while the product is still in
the manufacturer's possession and before it has been sold to the
intended consumer. This inconsistency came to a head in Campbell v.
Altec Industries, Inc.,'96 which was discussed in a prior survey.197 In
that case, the plaintiff was injured while operating a lower boom lift
cylinder on a bucket truck. Georgia Power Company ordered the bucket
truck from Altec Industries in March 1997. In early October 1997, Altec
Industries purchased a lower boom lift cylinder from Texas Hydraulics,
and the lower boom lift cylinder arrived at the Altec Industries facility
in Missouri by October 10, 1997. Altec Industries installed the lower
boom lift cylinder on the lift portion of the bucket truck by January 2,
1998, and, on January 14, 1998, it installed the lift portion of the bucket
truck (with the lower boom lift cylinder attached) on a test chassis.
After testing the lower boom lift cylinder several times with the test
chassis, Altec Industries transported the lift portion of the bucket truck
to its facility in Alabama. The lift portion of the bucket truck was
installed on the permanent chassis of the bucket truck in March 1998,
and the completed bucket truck was delivered to Georgia Power in April
1998.198

The plaintiff filed his complaint on February 4, 2008, alleging that the
lower boom lift cylinder was defective, and the defendants moved for
partial summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs claims for
design and manufacturing defects were barred by the statute of
repose. 9 The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia agreed and held that the ten-year repose period began
running on January 14, 1998, when Altec Industries installed the lift
portion of the bucket truck (with the lower boom lift cylinder attached)
on a test chassis. 20 0 At that time, the district court reasoned, the
lower boom lift cylinder had been placed into the stream of commerce
and was able to be used for its intended purpose, and Altec Industries
did not intend to hold it in inventory for a later sale. 20 1 Thus, the
20 2
plaintiff filed his complaint three weeks too late.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

No. 1:08-CV-0810-JOF, 2009 WL 426472 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2009).
Brannen & Daly, 2009 Annual Survey, supra note 88, at 294-96.
Campbell, 2009 WL 426472, at *1.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
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On appeal in Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit was unable to reconcile
Pafford and Johnson because neither case definitely resolved whether
the repose period began running (1) when the lower boom lift cylinder
was completed or tested (January 1998); (2) when the bucket truck was
completely assembled (March 1998); or (3) when the completed bucket
truck was delivered to Georgia Power (April 1998).203 Consequently,
the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to the Georgia
Supreme Court:
In a strict liability or negligence action, does the statute of repose in
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 begin running when (1) a component part causing
an injury is assembled or tested, (2) a finished product, which includes
an injuring component part, is assembled, or (3) a finished product,
which includes an injuring component part, is delivered to its initial
purchaser?"
In answering the Eleventh Circuit's certified question, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that "the statute of repose found in OCGA § 51-111(b)(2) begins to run when a finished product is sold as new to the
intended consumer who is to receive the product, in this case, Georgia
Power Company."20 s Relying on Pafford's focus on the person who was
ultimately intended to use the product rather than some intermediary
middleman, the supreme court explained that "nothing in either the
statute, or this Court's precedent, supports a conclusion that liability
under OCGA § 51-1-11(bXl) attaches while the product remains in the
hands of the manufacturer, or that the statute of repose under OCGA
§ 51-1-11(bX2) begins while the product is still in the hands of the
manufacturer."20 6 In other words, "OCGA § 51-1-11(bX2) refers to the
sale of the finished product to the consumer who is intended to receive
it as new."2 07 Because Johnson is inconsistent with this interpretation
of the phrase "first sale for use or consumption," the Georgia Supreme
Court overruled it. 2 0 8
Under this interpretation, the ten-year repose period was not triggered
until the completed bucket truck was delivered to Georgia Power in April
1998, which meant that the plaintiff had until April 2008 to file his
complaint.2 09 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff timely

203. Campbell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 605 F.3d 839, 842 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
204. Id.
205. Campbell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 288 Ga. 535, 535, 707 S.E.2d 48, 48-49 (2011)
(footnote omitted).
206. Id. at 539, 707 S.E.2d at 51.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Campbell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 635 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
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filed his complaint on February 4, 2008 and that, therefore, the district
court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants.21 0
Assumption of the Risk
"The affirmative defense of assumption of the risk bars recovery when
it is established that a plaintiff, without coercion of circumstances,
chooses a course of action with full knowledge of its danger and while
exercising a free choice as to whether to engage in the act or not."2 H
In product liability cases, this defense bars both negligence claims and
strict liability claims.212 To establish that a plaintiff assumed the risk,
a defendant must show that "the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of
the danger; (2) understood and appreciated the risks associated with
such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to those risks."2 1 3 As
this suggests, "the standard to be applied in assessing an assumption of
the risk defense is a subjective one, geared to the particular plaintiff and
his situation, rather than that of a reasonable person of ordinary
prudence who appears in the completely separate defense of contributory
negligence."214 Whether a plaintiff assumed the risk of injury is
usually a question for the jury, but the issue may be determined as a
matter of law if the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed.21 5
To assume a risk, a plaintiff must have subjective knowledge of "the
specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition
that proximately causes injury."216 A comprehension of "general, nonspecific risks that might be associated with such conditions or activities"
will not suffice. 217 Because the standard is subjective, it necessarily
incorporates the plaintiff's capacity to recognize, understand, and
appreciate a danger and to respond to the danger.21 8 Thus, "there is
no legal bar to applying assumption of the risk, as a matter of law, to
the conduct of a child between [the ages of seven and fourteen]," as long
C.

210. Id.
211. Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 807, 523 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
212. Whirlpool Corp. v. Hurlbut, 166 Ga. App. 95, 100-01, 303 S.E.2d 284, 288-89
(1983).
213. Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864, 471 S.E.2d 866, 868 (1996).
214. Muldovan, 271 Ga. at 808, 523 S.E.2d at 569 (punctuation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
215. Bodymasters Sports Indus., Inc. v. Wimberley, 232 Ga. App. 170, 174, 501 S.E.2d
556, 560 (1998).
216. Vaughn, 266 Ga. at 864, 471 S.E.2d at 868.
217. Id.
218. Spooner v. City of Camilla, 256 Ga. App. 179, 181, 568 S.E.2d 109, 111 (2002).
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as the elements of the defense are otherwise satisfied.21 9 When
assessing a child's knowledge, the same standard of subjectivity applies,
and so generalizations about the knowledge children have of certain
dangers and the propensity of children to exercise poor judgment "are
not appropriate yardsticks for assessing [a particular child's] knowledge
of the risk."22 o That being said, the law presumes that certain dangers, such as the risk of falling from great heights, are generally
understood and appreciated by children because they are so obvious:
[N]o danger is more commonly realized or risk appreciated, even by
children, than that of falling; consciousness of the force of gravity
results almost from animal instinct. Certainly a normal child of nearly
[nine] years of age knows that if [he] steps or slips from a tree, a fence,
or other elevated structure, [he] will fall to the ground and be hurt."'
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided one case during the survey
period involving a child's assumption of the risk. In Kane v. Landscape
Structures, Inc. ,222 the plaintiffs' nine-year-old child, Steven, was
injured when he fell while climbing on playground equipment at
Mountain Park in Gwinnett County. The equipment, which was known
as the "Infant Maze," was designed for children between the ages of
eighteen months and three years and consisted of several vertical panels
that were thirty-one inches in height and that had a variety of vertically
and horizontally mounted handholds to help children maintain their
balance while playing. The Infant Maze also included four posts on
which a pitched roof was mounted. The pitched roof was seven feet in
height at its peak. One day when Steven and his family were at
Mountain Park, Steven and his thirteen-year-old brother went to the
playground while their parents and sister watched a softball game.
Steven climbed on top of one of the vertical panels, which was only one
inch wide, and when he tried to climb onto the pitched roof from the
panel, he slipped and fell onto the vertical panel below him. His parents

219. Id. at 182, 568 S.E.2d at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted). There are
numerous cases holding that a young child assumed the risk of injury. See, e.g., Abee v.
Stone Mountain Mem. Ass'n, 252 Ga. 465, 466, 314 S.E.2d 444, 445 (1984) (holding that
11-year-old boy assumed the risk); Rice v. Oaks Investors II, 292 Ga. App. 692, 694, 666
S.E.2d 63, 65 (2008) (holding that 10-year-old girl assumed the risk).
220. Garner v. Rite Aid of Ga., Inc., 265 Ga. App. 737, 742, 595 S.E.2d 582, 587 (2004)
(physical precedent) (affirming the trial court's exclusion of a child and adolescent
psychiatrist's testimony about general adolescent knowledge and behavior that was not tied
to the specific children involved in the case).
221. O'Neal v. Sikes, 271 Ga. App. 391, 392, 609 S.E.2d 734, 735 (2005) (second, third,
and fourth alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. 309 Ga. App. 14, 709 S.E.2d 876 (2011) (en banc).
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sued the manufacturer of the Infant Maze, alleging that it was
defectively designed and that it lacked appropriate warnings. The
manufacturer moved for summary judgment on the ground that Steven
assumed the risk of injury, and the trial court granted the motion."'
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that Steven lacked actual knowledge
of and did not appreciate the danger of falling onto a vertical panel while
trying to climb onto the pitched roof.2 24 To the contrary, the evidence
showed that Steven knew the Infant Maze was intended for younger
children, knew the Infant Maze was not intended for climbing, and knew
that his mother probably would not have approved of him climbing on
the Infant Maze.225 In fact, his mother had previously warned him
about the dangers of climbing on various objects, including structures
shorter than the Infant Maze. 22 6 There
1
was nothing about the Infant
Maze that gave Steven any reason to believe that he could not fall from
it or that he would not be hurt if he fell.227 Further, the vertical panel
on which he fell was open and visible, and its hardness was obvious to
anyone who had climbed on top of it.22 8 Under these circumstances,
the court of appeals held that the manufacturer was entitled to summary
judgment because Steven sufficiently appreciated the obvious danger of
falling from the Infant Maze.229
Relying on a case involving a nine-year-old child who was injured
when she ran into the path of a truck, Judge Barnes dissented because
she believed that Steven's knowledge of the danger associated with
climbing on the Infant Maze was not specific enough.2 30 Judge Barnes
focused on the "seemingly innocuous nature" of the Infant Maze, the
placement of the horizontal handholds on the vertical panels, which
violated certain guidelines of the Consumer Product Safety Commission
and standards of the American Society for Testing and Materials, and
the fact that Steven had not seen anyone else fall while climbing on the
Infant Maze.2 3 ' The majority rebutted Judge Barnes's reliance on the
traffic case with the following observation: "Gravity, unlike traffic on a
quiet street or driveway, is always present, and so, unlike a quiet street

223. Id. at 14-16, 709 S.E.2d at 877-79. The opinion of the court of appeals includes
a photograph of the Infant Maze. Id. at 15, 709 S.E.2d at 878.
224. Id. at 17, 709 S.E.2d at 879.
225. Id. at 18-19, 709 S.E.2d at 880.
226. Id. at 18, 709 S.E.2d at 880.
227. Id. at 18-19, 709 S.E.2d at 880.
228. Id. at 19, 709 S.E.2d at 880.
229. Id. at 19, 709 S.E.2d at 880-81.
230. Id. at 23, 709 S.E.2d at 883 (Barnes, J., dissenting) (discussing Atlanta Affordable
Hous. Fund L.P. v. Brown, 253 Ga. App. 286, 558 S.E.2d 827 (2002)).
231. Id. at 23 & n.9, 709 S.E.2d at 883 & n.9.
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or driveway that only sometimes poses a danger to pedestrians of being
struck by traffic, climbing something always poses a danger of falling
from it."232 As to the seemingly innocuous appearance of the Infant
Maze, the majority noted that "[playground equipment, of course, need
not look like a deathtrap to suggest to a nine-year-old child that
climbing it is a bad idea."2 33 Similarly, the fact that Steven had not
seen anyone else fall does not mean that he did not understand and
As the majority explained, "[tihat
appreciate the danger involved.'
without drowning, play around
lake
in
a
swim
children
other
a child sees
places without falling does
to
high
climb
and
fire without being burned,
activities any less apparin
such
involved
risk
not make the obvious
235
these activities, thereby
in
succeed
Even if other children
ent."
causing the observing child to believe that the probability of being
injured is less than it actually is, the analysis does not change because
"assumption of the risk does not require an accurate assessment of the
precise probability that a danger will be realized and an injury
sustained, only an appreciation that the danger exists."2 36

232. 309 Ga. App. at 20, 709 S.E.2d at 881 (majority opinion).
233. Id. at 19 n.2, 709 S.E.2d at 881 n.2.
234. Id. at 19 n.4, 709 S.E.2d at 881 n.4.
235. Id.
236. Id. The majority did not address Judge Barnes's point about the improper
placement of the horizontal handholds on the vertical panels. There does not appear to be
any binding precedent on the issue, but there is no reason why a defendant's noncompliance with government regulations or private industry standards should preclude it from
asserting assumption of the risk as a defense. After all, even if such noncompliance were
evidence of negligence per se, negligence per se is not liability per se. R&R Insulation
Servs., Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., 307 Ga. App. 419, 425, 705 S.E.2d 223, 231 (2010).
Further, an absence of negligence by the defendant is not an element of assumption of the
risk; indeed, the whole point of assumption of the risk is that the plaintiff has in effect
consented to the defendant's negligence. Muldovan, 271 Ga. at 808, 523 S.E.2d at 569. In
other words, the defendant's noncompliance has nothing to do with the plaintiffs
knowledge of the danger involved.

